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Kurzfassung
Vorbemerkung
Seit 1991 ist Rußland an einer Reihe gewaltsamer Konflikte auf dem Territorium der Gemein-
schaft Unabhängiger Staaten beteiligt. Die militärischen Aktivitäten haben dabei ganz unter-
schiedliche Gestalt angenommen - von friedenserhaltenden Einsätzen bis hin zu direkter mili-
tärischer Intervention -,  und sind dementsprechend unterschiedlich bewertet worden - als effi-
ziente Stabilisierung in interethnischen "Konfliktsituationen" oder als Teil einer "Reimperialisie-
rungsstrategie". Bisher ist dabei nicht immer berücksichtigt worden, daß es sich bei den russi-
schen "Peacekeeping"-Aktivitäten um Einsatz militärischer Gewalt zur Stabilisierung - oder "Pa-
zifizierung" einer Region handelt, die als Zone vitaler russischer sicherheitspolitischer Interessen 
gesehen wird. Der vorliegende Bericht stellt sich daher die Aufgabe, die militärischen Aktivitäten 
Rußlands im Kontext seiner regionalen Sicherheitsinteressen zu analysieren. Dabei stützt er sich 
auf eine Reihe von Fallstudien und auf die Auswertung der laufenden Berichterstattung in der 
Presse.
Ergebnisse
1. Nachdem die russische Politik in den ersten Jahren nach dem Zerfall der UdSSR zunächst zö-
gerte, in den Konflikten, die innerhalb der neuen unabhängigen Staaten aufbrachen, zu 
intervenieren, bildete sich seit etwa 1993 in der herrschenden Elite ein Konsens darüber 
heraus, daß die Region der GUS Bedeutung für russische Sicherheitsinteressen habe. Die 
fortdauernden Auseinandersetzungen in  diesem Raum  geboten daher  eine militärische 
Intervention.  Dabei  ging es  zunächst  um die  Verteidigung der  Einheit  der  russischen 
Föderation, dann um die Steuerung der Konflikte in der GUS und die Reduzierung des 
Gewaltniveaus.  Darüber  hinaus  gewannen  Motive  der  Verteidigung  der  Rechte  der 
russischen Minderheit  und  des  Schutzes  der  Außengrenzen der  Region,  der  früheren 
sowjetischen Staatsgrenzen, an Gewicht. Der russische Einfluß in den neuen unabhängigen 
Staaten sollte gestärkt, fremde Einflüsse sollten zurückgedämmt und der Zugriff auf die 
wirtschaftlichen  Ressourcen  der  GUS  sichergestellt  werden.  Neben  dem  nationalen 
Interesse  kommen  zudem  noch  Partikularinteressen  einzelner  Gruppen  -  der 
Machtministerien oder der Eliten einzelner Regionen - zum Tragen.
2. Anfangs lehnte die russische politische Klasse den Einsatz militärischer Gewalt ab. Die Kon-
stituierung von nationalen Regierungen in Tschetschenien, Georgien und Moldova, die 
sich offen gegen die Moskauer Regierung wandten, sowie die islamistische Bewegung in 
Tadschikistan wurde von der russischen Politik hingenommen. Im Falle Tschetschenien 
untersagte der Oberste Sowjet Ende 1991 ausdrücklich den Einsatz militärischer Gewalt. 
Bald stellte sich jedoch heraus, daß die russische Führung kaum über Mittel verfügte, auf 
die Entwicklung in diesen Regionen einzuwirken. Die wirtschaftlichen, finanziellen und 
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diplomatischen Einflußmöglichkeiten Rußlands waren gering, daher griff Rußland auf das 
einzige Instrument zurück, über das es verfügte - die Streitkräfte.
3. Die Ziele, denen der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt dienen sollte, waren vielfältig. In einigen 
Fällen  ging  es  um  Unterdrückung  sezessionistischer  Bewegungen,  in  anderen darum, 
Chaos und bewaffnete Gewalt  einzudämmen, oder - im Vorfeld von Konflikten - den 
Frieden zu bewahren. Darüber hinaus zielte der Einsatz aber in einigen Regionen - z.B. in 
Georgien - auf die Installation und Unterstützung eines rußlandfreundlichen Regimes oder 
darauf,  Voraussetzungen für  einen politischen Dialog  zu  schaffen.  Neben solch'  eher 
politischen Intentionen wurden auch rein militärische Absichten verfolgt - die Wahrung des 
"einheitlichen strategischen Raums" und die Eindämmung möglicher militärischer Bedro-
hungen. Die Trennlinie zwischen friedlichen Einsätzen und der Anwendung militärischer 
Gewalt läßt sich in der GUS nicht scharf ziehen. Trugen die Maßnahmen in Südossetien 
und Transdnistrien durchaus friedenserhaltenden Charakter, so ging es in Georgien Ende 
1993  offensichtlich  um  die  Demonstration  militärischer  Stärke.  Wiederholt  wurden 
Truppen im Kontext von Polizeimaßnahmen, bei der Terrorismusbekämpfung oder bei 
eigenen verdeckten Operationen tätig.  Offen wurde militärische Gewalt  in einer Reihe 
friedensschaffender Aktionen, bei der Grenzverteidigung oder - im Falle Tschetschenien - 
im regelrechten Krieg eingesetzt.
4. Theoretisch wird der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt von den Prinzipien der Legalität, der Prä-
vention und der Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten des anderen Staates be-
stimmt. In der Praxis war allerdings von all dem wenig zu bemerken. Im Rahmen der GUS 
gab es in seltenen Fällen Abkommen über friedenserhaltende Schritte, mitunter beschränkt 
sich die rechtliche Grundlage auf dreiseitige Abkommen zwischen Rußland und den krieg-
führenden Seiten. Über den Einsatz russischer Truppen entscheidet de jure der Präsident, 
de facto scheint die Entscheidung in einem kleinen Zirkel zu fallen. Die Militärs haben 
anscheinend nirgends den Beginn militärischer Aktionen betrieben. Sobald sie allerdings in 
die Konflikte verwickelt waren, haben sie sich teilweise der Kontrolle durch die Politik ent-
zogen und auf eigene Faust Entscheidungen getroffen.
5. Es ist klar, daß eine militärische Lösung innerstaatlicher Konflikte nicht möglich ist, vielmehr 
muß die Politik diese Aufgabe übernehmen. In vielen Fällen ist dies jedoch nicht gelungen. 
Einsätze russischer Streitkräfte werden durch den Mangel finanzieller Mittel, die Opposition 
der  Wehrpflichtigen  und  ihrer  Verwandten,  sowie  die  sinkende  Kampfkraft  der  Armee 
behindert. Trotzdem haben die russischen Streitkräfte in einer Reihe von Fällen militärische 
Erfolge erzielen können, die allerdings von der Politik nicht zur endgültigen Konfliktlösung 
genutzt  wurden.  Das  hat  Rückwirkungen auf  die  Streitkräfte,  die  sich  an  vielen  Orten 
praktisch  im  Kriege befinden.  Fortgesetzte  Verluste  und  wachsende Kosten belasten  die 
russische Politik. Eine klare Strategie der Nutzung militärischer Gewalt ist nicht erkennbar.
Introduction
For some, it is a question of terminology. There is a long-standing debate as to the true nature of 
Russian mirotvorchestvo, which is literally translated as "peacemaking" or peace-creating. Much 
has been said about  the many differences between the Russian  concept and practice in  the 
conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the theory and practice of peacekeeping, as understood 
in the West, especially in the classic United Nations context, although UN/NATO's massive 
bombardment of Bosnian Serb targets in the autumn of 1995 has somewhat narrowed the gap 
here. Some observers have seen in it a manifestation of the enduring expansionist instinct, and 
have objected at least to the forms of Russian military involvement. Respecting the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Soviet successor states, and abiding by the rules of international 
law, when dealing with them are demanded of Russia as a matter of principle.1 The Chechen war 
was singled out for special scrutiny and criticism.
Clearly, the Russian approach is anything but impartial, pro-active rather than restrained, and - 
often more effective. Since 1992, it has been criticized and defended on these counts. Often, the 
criticism would exploit the theme of the empire, while the defence would present the Russian 
involvement as a relative success story. Little attempt has been made, however, to take Russian 
mirotvorchestvo for what it obviously is, i.e. the use of military force as a  way of stability-
building, or pacification, in what is officially regarded as the zone of Moscow's vital national 
security interests. Thus, it appears artificial to treat various cases of Russian military activism in 
intra-state conflicts separately. Viewed from this angle, this new Russian interventionism comes 
much closer to such cases as India's 1988 expedition in Sri Lanka, or Vietnam's 1979 invasion of 
Cambodia, or the perennial French military activism in Francophone Africa, or even by Israel in 
Southern Lebanon.
Interestingly, most literature on the subject represents case studies, while works of a more general 
nature are few. It is the purpose of this paper, then, to examine Russia's modern interventionism 
as a form of its national security strategy in post-Soviet "hot spots". Also, an attempt will be 
made to infer from the experience of several years a  general  pattern of the use of force by 
Moscow in crisis situations, as well as for conflict-prevention and dispute resolution. With this in 
mind, the paper is not limited to the cases which are generally recognized as peacekeeping, or 
which are claimed to be such. In fact, all cases of the use of military force by Russia, whether in 
the territory of the New Independent States (NIS) or within the Federation itself. It seems to be 
equally  challenging to  analyse  the  situations in  which force was  not  used by the  Russian 
Federation, despite the undisputable conflict potential and the strong interests involved. Finally, it 
is important to compare this latest Russian experience with the Soviet actions of the late 1980s, 
from Karabakh to Baku and Tskhinvali to Ferghana and Osh. The subject matter of the paper 
being so vast, nothing but an outline discussion will be attempted here, with the purpose of 
establishing a framework for future research.
1. Interests Demanding the Use of Force
One would properly start with the question, What interests compel the Russian Federation to use 
military force in the various zones of conflict? Normally, only vital national security concerns 
justify the use of military force. It appears that, initially, in late 1991 and early 1992, Russia was 
extremely reluctant to intervene anywhere, if it meant using military force. The change, when it 
1 Robert Blackwill in: Engaging Russia. A Report to the Trilateral Commission No.46, 1995, p.36.
came, in 1993, was the product of a wide-ranging debate within the Russian political elite on 
what constituted the Russian national interests, and which of them were vital enough to justify 
the use of all available means, including the military force.
While this debate is not over yet, there is a growing consensus within the ruling elite that the 
entire post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) represents an area of Russia's vital 
national interests, to secure which the new states should be integrated, in one form or another, 
with the Russian Federation. In the meantime, many of these countries - and Russia itself - are 
still deep in crisis, which lead to internal conflicts. Russian experts believe that crisis-breeding 
instability will exist throughout the whole post-Communist transition period, which is tentatively 
put at between 20 and 30 years for Russia, and up to 50 years, in the case of some of the CIS 
states. With respect to those conflicts, the following Russian national interests compel Moscow to 
intervene militarily:
Defending the unity of the Russian Federation
Military force has traditionally been regarded as the ultimate instrument of defending the terri-
torial integrity of the state. The weakening of the Russian state after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union has underscored the danger of internal secessionist challenges. The fate of the 
USSR itself provides an example of the state authorities preferring to abdicate in the face of the 
nationalist challenge, rather than using military force. Mikhail Gorbachev, who until the last 
minute tried to keep the Soviet Union together, made no attempt to use force to prevent the 
break-up of the USSR. (Whether recourse to force was ever an effective alternative is doubtful: 
suffice it to look at former Yugoslavia.). In much the same way, the Russian Supreme Soviet 
(parliament) called off in October, 1991, the military action, which had been already launched, to 
enforce the state of emergency in Chechnya, only weeks after General Dudayev's "revolution".
Soon, however, the new Russian leaders became aware of the danger of the Russian Federation 
following the fate of the Soviet Union, but in a much less neat and probably violent way. Boris 
Yeltsin, who had at one time promised the republics within Russia almost unlimited sovereignty, 
did turn to military force in order to put an end to the Chechen Republic's de-facto independence 
which, it was felt, threatened to destabilize Russia's North Caucasus, and to provoke other non-
Russian republics within the RF, such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia/Sakha and others 
into seeking independence from Moscow.2
Whether Chechnya's secession3 would have led to the disintegration of Russia is a moot question. 
The  decision in  July  1995  of  the  Russian  Constitutional  Court,  which endorsed President 
Yeltsin's decree of December 1994  that  served as a  legal basis for the military operation in 
Chechnya, gives a clear signal: secession of any part of Russia will not be tolerated and force 
may be used, if necessary, to prevent this.
2 For a concise official expose of the case against Dudayev's regime, cf., e.g., Vice Premier Sergei Shakhrai. 
Prezident obespechival bezopasnost Rossii. "Rossiyskaya Gazeta", 12 July 1995, p.1. Also to be noted should 
be the upper house speaker Vladimir Shumeiko's dark warnings, made in early 1995, to use force, if need be, 
against illegal armed formations anywhere, be it in Tatarstan or in Volgograd region.
3 The republic's population is less than 1 per cent, its territory only 0.1 per cent, and potential oil production 
around 0.3 per cent of Russia's.
Keeping the peace inside the Russian Federation
Immediately after the break-up of the USSR, Russia itself was spared ethnic conflicts inside its 
territory. This changed with the outbreak of the North Ossetian-Ingush armed conflict in the 
autumn of 1992. Since that time, two districts affected by the conflict were placed under emer-
gency rule enforced by the federal troops. Despite their presence, occasional acts of violence do 
happen. This situation was likened by some observers to the one which long existed in Northern 
Ireland.
Russian forces were deployed to restore order in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria,  and then pre-
ventively in other parts of the North Caucasus.
Managing the crises in the New Independent States
The crises in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union present a threat of a spillover 
of armed violence and ethnic strife to Russia. This is facilitated by the existence of open or 
inadequately controlled borders, the unclarities regarding the issues of citizenship, the existence 
of Russian minorities in zones of conflict in the NIS and of the various ethnic groups in Russia 
with ties to the parties to conflicts. Russia cannot ignore this threat and has to deal with it. Crisis-
management  requires  mounting  various  peace  operations,  from  peacekeeping  to  peace 
enforcement.
Reducing the level and the scale of violence
While most conflicts take a long time to resolve, introducing cease-fires can sharply reduce the 
level of violence and save numerous human lives. Much has been said by official Moscow about 
the Russian historic responsibility as the successor state of the USSR, or  about  the need to 
vindicate  post-Communist  Russia's democratic  credentials,  or,  more recently,  about  Russia's 
leading role in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Whatever one's attitude to these claims, 
it can be argued that there is no international organization and no power, other than Russia, that 
has made a serious effort to stop violence in the former USSR.
Protecting ethnic Russian minorities
Much anxiety was expressed in the neighbouring countries about Russian officials' pronounce-
ments regarding the need to protect ethnic Russians in the NIS. The military doctrine of the 
Russian Federation, adopted in November 1993, contains a passage to that effect. "Behind the 
Russian border guards in Tajikistan there are 12.5 million ethnic Russians in the Central Asian 
states and an open border all the way to Moscow", said General Andrei Nikolayev, Director of 
the Federal Frontier Service.4
So far, however, there has been little evidence of Russian use of force to defend the rights of 
ethnic brethren in what is called the "near abroad". Moldova and Tajikistan come perhaps closest 
to that, but both of these conflicts were essentially political. The majority of Moldova's Russians 
live in the part of the republic which did not seceed. In Tajikistan, violence was not specifically 
directed at the Russian community, who suffered greatly, but from the side effects of a clan-
driven civil war.
4 As quoted by Arkady Dubnov. "Novoye Vremya", No.16, April 1995, p. 12.
In Tajikistan and also in Abkhazia,  the Russian armed forces were used to evacuate ethnic 
Russians - and indeed many others who were fleeing the war - but this was neither the reason nor 
even the pretext for Russian military involvement. In the absence of clarity regarding whom 
Russia can rightfully regard as her own, for potentially Russian citizenship is open to virtually all 
former Soviet passport-holders, no parallel can be drawn between, for example, the August, 1992 
Sukhumi evacuation and the rescue operation of U.S. marines in Liberia in 1990.
It is interesting that there was no serious attempt, so far, to use military force to end what is 
widely perceived in  Russia  as  discriminatory treatment of non-indigenous population in the 
Baltic States, primarily in Estonia and Latvia, or to back up popular demands that predominantly 
ethnic Russian-populated Crimea be given independence from Ukraine or be allowed to join 
Russia where it belonged until 1954. Moscow is obviously not looking for conflicts, and possibly 
wars with its western neighbours, or for a resumption of confrontation with the West. Most ethnic 
Russians themselves, fully aware of what they are likely to lose in such an event, come out 
strongly against military protection from the old metropolis.
Defending former Soviet borders
Russian border troops officers on the Tajik-Afghan border regard the lines they are defending as 
Russia's true strategic boundaries. If they were withdrawn, the new Tajik state would probably 
disintegrate, and become the first failed state in the former Soviet Union. Russian officials claim 
that there is no way they can find funds to construct new border posts and fortifications along 
Russia's new frontiers.5
Sticking to the old borders in the name of defence does not exclude the latent interest in keeping 
an option for power projection capability. When Russia will have emerged from the period of her 
historical weakness, the argument goes, she might need the forward positions in places like 
Moldova, the Caucasus or Central Asia.
Strengthening Russia's influence in the NIS
Russia's forces in the zones of conflict are a visible symbol of Russia's presence. Sending troops 
to manage conflicts, and arbitrating between the warring parties is a way for Russia to establish 
itself as the dominant power in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In the autumn of 1993, Russian 
military support for the Abkhaz fighting the Georgians, followed by Russia's military support for 
the Shevardnadze government in Tbilisi against Gamsakhurdist rebels in the west of the country, 
were instrumental in bringing Georgia into the CIS. The inability of both Baku and Chisinea to 
resolve conflicts in Karabakh and Transdniestria has been an important factor in the Azeri and 
Moldovan governments' decision to join the CIS, also in 1993.
Conversely, there are fears that, should the Russian forces withdraw from Tajikistan, this would 
result in a tremendous loss of Russian prestige.
Preventing foreign penetration into the geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union
Often, Russian forces were sent to the zones of conflict to exclude the possibility that others, 
whether individual states or international organizations, should take the lead in conflict man-
5 The costs are estimated to be around $500,000 per kilometer, and Russia's border with Kazakhstan alone runs 
for some 7,000 km. Priority is given to properly equipping frontiers with the Baltic States and Transcaucasia.
agement and dispute resolution. Thus,  the decisions to deploy peacekeepers to Moldova (in 
1992) and Abkhazia (1994) were prompted by fears that outside countries, such as Romania, or 
international organizations, as the UN, might get involved in peacekeeping on a significant scale.
The Chechen invasion was in part prompted by the suspected Turkish connection, and the de-
cision to play an active role in Tajikistan, by Moscow's unwillingness to cede Russia's historical 
positions to the neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
The spread of Islamic fundamentalism is feared by Russian elites as much, or even more, than 
conventional penetration by foreign powers, in a latter-day version of the Great Game. Thus, 
Russia is using military means as a principal hedge against a variety of politico-economic and 
ideological challenges. There is no doubt that Russia is determined to preserve its pre-eminence 
across the former USSR. It is not clear, however, that the choice of means for this is adequate.
Securing control over the natural resources of the NIS
Securing access to the natural resources of the NIS, or their transportation routes represents the 
economic interest behind Russian interventionism.
Tajikistan, for instance, has been Russia's principal source of aluminium, titanium-oxide and 
vanadium catalyzers, vismuth, antimony, barium. The country is also rich in gold and molibde-
num, and could well become one of the world's leading producers of gold and silver. No way for 
Russia to leave, but every reason to stay. Federal Border Service Director Nikolayev declared 
that  his  men  in  Tajikistan  were  "defending  economic  and  political  interests  of  the  Com-
monwealth".6 This misses one important point. While the Russian troops, implicated in a civil 
war in Tajikistan, "defend Russia's economic interests", some of these very riches are being taken 
over by foreigners.
The prospects for solving the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia is co-sponsoring the 
peace process, and the war in Chechnya are linked to the issue of choosing the route for the 
pipeline which would transport the Caspian Sea oil to Europe. The perceived need to control the 
Caspian Sea oil and gas fields, and the pipelines, has strengthened Moscow's wish to become the 
principal peacekeeper in Karabakh, with its forces on the ground. However, the use of force in 
Chechnya  to  secure  the  oil  pipeline  may  be  counter-productive:  the  pipeline  has  become 
extremely vulnerable to sabotage.
"Protecting the unity of the economic space of the Federation" was also one of the interests 
demanding the ending of the Dudayev rebellion. The only two-track railway to Transcaucasia 
passes through Chechnya. By early 1994, it had become so unreliable that plans were made to 
build a route around Chechnya. Grozny's oil refineries were built to process between 16 and 20 
million tons. Chechnya also used to produce over 90 per cent of aviation oil produced in the 
USSR. Thus, Russian air force and civil aviation immediately became dependent on Chechnya 
once it proclaimed its sovereignty. More importantly, the Grozny airport, off limits to Russian 
passport and customs controls, has become an-all Russian centre for illegal immigration and 
smuggling. The cost of "protection of unity" by military force, however, is enormous, far out-
stripping all potential alternatives.
Russia's interest in stopping illicit arms and drugs trafficking are often quoted as demanding the 
use of border troops, especially on the Tajik-Afghan border, but also on the Chechen section of 
6 As quoted by Liana Minasyan in "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 14 April 1995, p. 1.
the  border  with  Georgia  and  along  the  administrative  boundaries  between  Chechnya  and 
Daghestan and Ingushetia.
Besides the national interests there are special interests of the particular groups which can play a 
very significant role, especially now that the Russian state is relatively weak, and the special-
interest groups are in a better position than ever to promote their agendas, using the state as a 
vehicle. These include:
Interests of various political groups competing for power in Moscow
In 1991-1993, the Supreme Soviet (the old parliament) used to exploit the conflicts in the NIS in 
its struggle against the Presidency. Trying to champion the cause of Russian patriotism and 
looking for allies against the executive, it supported, in particular, the Transdniestrians against 
Chisinea, the Abkhazians against Tbilisi, and, most strongly, Simferopol in its political dispute 
against Kiev.
Closely linked with those are interests of various agencies of the Russian government, such as the 
"power ministries".7 Usually, these agencies are interested in bolstering their positions within the 
government, securing a larger share of the federal budget, etc. A way of achieving this is through 
demonstrating their importance and utility to the state where they enjoy a monopoly, i.e. in the 
use of force.
In certain cases, regional interests may exercise substantial influence at the federal level. The 
case of Nikolai Yegorov, a former governor of Krasnodar in southern Russia with strong ties to 
the local Cossack movement, who as Nationalities Minister and Deputy Premier (in 1994-1995) 
was among the prime movers of the Chechen war, is very significant, but not unique. President 
Askharbek Galazov of North Ossetia, considered by Moscow to be the most reliable ally in the 
volatile region of the North Caucasus, had considerable influence on the Russian decision to 
engage in a peacekeeping operation in South Ossetia (June 1992), and on the way Russian forces 
were used during the Ossetian-Ingush conflict (in the autumn of 1992).
Private interests of high officials and business circles whom they patronise are by no means trifle 
in the contemporary Russian context. Informal coalitions are formed not so much to protect and 
promote the perceived national interest, for example, in Tajikistan, but to make personal profits 
on illegal cross-border deals.8 Arms deals involving transfers of large quantities of arms out of the 
local Russian arsenals are notorious in Transcaucasia. There are allegations that the pro-Abkhaz 
lobby, which remains strong even in 1995,  is motivated, in part,  by financial and economic 
interests of top military.9 Chechnya, however, stands out even against this background. Many 
Russians believe that the war there was started to cover up illegal dealings between Dudayev and 
groups in Moscow. Arkady Volski, the deputy head of the Russian delegation at the Grozny talks 
with the Chechens, alluded in an NTV interview in August 1995 that both sides to the conflict 
could, in fact, have the same masters, after which he was effectively dropped from the delegation.
A brief examination of the interests, in the name of which Russia has been willing to use military 
force in various ways in the NIS demonstrates that most of these interests are real and in many 
cases vital  to the security of the Russian Federation. Moscow's intervention to protect these 
7 This term normally includes Defence and Interior, as well as the security community.
8 A deputy Interior Minister of Tajikistan claimed in an interview that Russian military transport planes were 
used to smuggle drugs out of Tajikistan.
9 Konstantin Eggert. Ideya federalizma ne nakhodit zhivogo otklika v Gruzii I Abkhazii. "Izvestia", 31 August 
1995, p. 3.
interests makes Russia a very interested peacemaker indeed. This can hardly change: in theory, 
Russia can be impartial towards the warring sides in a particular area. There is no way, however, 
that she can be impartial towards what she regards as her national interests.
The problem lies elsewhere. Russian domestic politics make consensus-building on any foreign-
policy issue,  including assigning relative  priorities  to  the  often competing interests,  and  of 
reaching agreement on the ways of protecting those interests, a highly difficult, if not impossible 
task.  Too  often, in  the conflict  of various national  interests, it  is  the parochial  interests of 
individual groups that prevail.
The interests described above can be pursued in many ways, not all of them requiring the use of 
military power. What are the reasons, then, for the particular choice of instruments?
2. Reasons for Using the Military
The Soviet Union grew out of a bitter civil war, in the course of which the Red Army spear-
headed Communist revolution in many of the provinces of the former Russian empire, such as 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia in Transcaucasia, or Bukhara in Central Asia, which briefly 
enjoyed independence from 1917 till 1921. In the 1920s, the army was used to subdue armed 
resistance in parts of Central Asia, and in the 1940s, NKVD troops were used to forcibly resettle 
those ethnic groups, such as Chechens or Crimean Tartars, which had been accused by Stalin of 
having cooperated with the Germans. Throughout  the 1940s  and the 1950s,  regular  forces 
conducted operations against guerilla  fighters in mountainous Chechnya, or in the forests of 
Lithuania and western Ukraine. 1962 saw the use of the Soviet army against Russian workers in 
the town of Novocherkassk, the first such employment against ethnic Russians since the defeat of 
anti-Communist sailors in Kronstadt and the ending of a peasant revolt in Tambov region in 
1921.
Throughout most of the Soviet period, it was police repression and fear, rather than open vio-
lence, which ensured internal stability.
As the Soviet Union started to disintegrate, there was general reluctance, on behalf of the Gor-
bachevian leadership, to  use force against nationalist aspirations in the republics. The cases 
where force was used, as in Tbilisi in April 1989, in Baku in January 1990, or in Vilnius in 
January 1991, demonstrated the unwillingness of the political leadership to assume responsibility 
for armed intervention, which led to the progressive demoralization of the armed forces and their 
alienation from the political masters. Public opinion in the country quickly became hostile to the 
very idea of the "internal function" of the Armed Forces.
Immediately after the dissolution of the USSR, the new Russian authorities shied away from 
using  force.  Predominantly  was  a  benign view of  the  nationalist  governments in  Georgia, 
Moldova, the Islamists in Tajikistan, and even the Dudayev regime in Chechnya as political 
allies of the Russian radical democrats. In the latter case, Russian President Yeltsin's proclama-
tion of the state of emergency in November, 1991, was countermanded by the Russian Supreme 
Soviet (parliament). The use of force remained politically unacceptable.
While non-interference continued to be the official policy line, withdrawal from the empire went 
ahead. In the process, Tbilisi and Chisinea received from the Russian military large quantities of 
arms and ammunition, which were soon used in internal conflicts.
Where force was used, it was often prompted by the situation, rather than by a careful analysis of 
the interests involved.
Very little attention having been paid to preventing conflicts, the Russian leadership was often 
surprised by the events and had to act urgently to stop a conflict which had already begun. Even 
conflicts within Russia were allowed to germinate, develop and burst out, as in the case of North 
Ossetia and Ingushetia (October 1992) or Chechnya (December 1994).
Of the various components of national power, the military component was in many cases the only 
one which was readily available. Soviet forces deployed in the non-Slav republics of the former 
USSR, now independent states, were taken over by the Russian Federation, which thus received 
military military instruments in the "near abroad". Other resources, such as economic, financial, 
diplomatic, were either lacking or very scarce. Especially notorious was the lack of financial 
resources. Many Russian officials admit that, if money were available, there would be far less of 
an incentive to use force. At least in one instance, however, the decision to use military force was 
taken and sustained irrespective of financial considerations. There are unconfirmed reports that 
the military operation in Chechnya has cost about $5bn.
Decisions to resort to military force were also prompted by the residual elements of the imperial 
tradition and by certain  historical  stereotypes. It  is  also  widely perceived by most  Russian 
military officers and many government officials that in the Caucasus and Central Asia raw power 
and the willingness to use it are generally respected, while preference for negotiations is seen as 
an unmistakable sign of weakness. Not to be overlooked is the fact that  most of the senior 
military commanders, from Minister Grachev down, have had their first combat experience in 
Afghanistan, which influenced their thinking enormously.
Lastly, the mentality of the Russian political elite still tends to overvalue the utility of military 
force, which continues to be perceived as offering the "final solution", however brute this might 
be.10
3. Objectives Sought through the Use of Military Force
The general political objectives of the use of Russian military force include:
Crushing a secessionist rebellion and reestablishing the federal authorities' control over the entire 
area of the RF
This was attempted, and almost accomplished, in Chechnya. The military claim, however, that 
the decision, taken in June, 1995, to stop fighting and start negotiating has robbed Russia of the 
fruits of military victory, so dearly paid for. Although Chechnya remains, to this date, the only 
case of outright rebellion within the RF, the notice served by the federal military operation on 
other would-be secessionists is obvious.
Stopping armed violence, ending chaos and lawlessness
This objective was fully achieved in South Ossetia and Transdniestria. Since the introduction in 
1992  of Russian peacekeeping forces to these two areas, fighting has not resumed there.11 In 
Abkhazia, Russian peacekeepers' authority to protect local civilians, mostly ethnic Georgians, 
from armed robbery and other forms of violence is limited to the 12-km-wide security zone where 
they are deployed.
10 For the official explanation of the reasons for using military force in Chechnya, see: Andrei Kozyrev. Part-
nership or Cold Peace? "Foreign Policy", No. 99, Summer 1995, pp. 3-14, esp. pp. 6-7.
11 The conflict in Moldova led to over 1,000 dead, about 5,000 wounded, over 100,000 refugees.
In  other  cases, Russian  military  intervention probably prevented larger-scale bloodshed and 
destruction. General Andrei Nikolaev, Director of Russia's Federal Border Service, is certain 
that,  "without the Border Troops, there would be civil war in Tajikistan".12 General Anatoli 
Kulikov,  once commander of the Interior  Ministry Forces in North Ossetia  and Ingushetia, 
claimed that, "without the Russian Interior Forces, not just the villages of Kartsa or Chermen, but 
the city of Vladikavkaz would lie in ruins".13
In the case of Chechnya, stopping an intra-Chechen strife was one of the arguments used by the 
Russian government to justify a federal military operation. This goal was accomplished, but not 
in the way it had been foreseen. Predictably, intra-Chechen fighting was merely postponed in the 
name of resisting the federal  forces. Meanwhile, Russian military commanders claim that  a 
withdrawal from Chechnya would provoke a bloodbath there.
Prevention of a civil war in a neighbouring country, or in a part of Russia itself is among the 
objectives most frequently cited. However, as the case of Afghanistan shows, even a massive 
Russian intervention may not be sufficient to reach it.
As to the defence of human rights, or fighting crime, the record is rather mediocre. Russian 
peacekeepers are barred from interfering in the internal affairs of the territories where they are 
located. In Abkhazia, for instance, they were unable to resist ethnic cleansing; in Tajikistan, to do 
anything against the atrocities committed by all  sides; in  Transdniestria,  General  Alexander 
Lebed's long campaign against high-level corruption in Tiraspol ended in the Russian general's 
dismissal.
Keeping the peace
In the cases where there was peace to keep (as in South Ossetia,  Moldova and North Os-
setia/Ingushetia since 1992, and the zone of the Georgian/Abkhazian conflict since 1994), the 
presence of the Russian peacekeepers has ensured observance of the cease-fire agreements, as 
well as contributed to political dialogue between the sides. One notable failure has been the lack 
of progress towards the return of the refugees (including about 200,000 ethnic Georgians who 
fled Abkhazia in 1993). In the absence of a final settlement in any of these conflicts, cease-fire 
lines, patrolled by Russian peacekeepers, have solidified into something resembling inter-state 
borders. This allowed unrecognized entities, such as the Republic of Abkhazia, the Dniestrian 
Moldavian Republic, to function as de-facto independent states.
Installing friendly political forces in power and supporting them ever since
This is a less well advertized but a very obvious objective of the use of the Russian military. In 
Georgia in January, 1992, the CIS forces reporting to Moscow materially assisted the rebels who 
toppled President Zviad Gamsakhurdia to make room for Edward Shevardnadze. In the autumn 
of 1993, Russian forces were deployed to western Georgia to suppress Gamsakhurdia's last effort 
to  regain  power.  Immediately  following  an  assassination  attempt  against  Shevardnadze  in 
August,  1995,  a  close aid  to Defence Minister  Grachev was dispatched to Tbilisi.  Russian 
military support was crucial for the Popular Front and President Emomali Rakhmonov which 
emerged victorious in  the  civil  war  in  Tajikistan  in  the  autumn  and  winter  of  1992.  The 
12 Andrei Nikolaev as quoted by Arkady Dubnov in :"Yest' li u Rossii 'tajikskaya politika'". "Novoye Vremya", 
No. 16, April 1995, p. 12.
13 Anatoli Kulikov, as quoted by "Krasnaya Zvezda", quoted in Ossipova, p. 22.
Transdniestrian and Abkhazian governments, and their self-proclaimed states, were both rescued 
in 1992 by Russian intervention. The military invasion of Chechnya was launched after a failed 
Russian covert operation attempted in late November, 1994,  which was to have toppled the 
Dudayev regime and installed a pro-Moscow administration.
This raises an important question: How controllable are Moscow's clients? Even Uzbekistan's 
President Islam Karimov questioned the wisdom of supporting the Rakhmonov government in 
Dushanbe, which didn't always accept Moscow's and Tashkent's advice, let alone always follow 
it.
Shevardnadze did not agree to what was demanded of him - entry into the CIS and allowing 
permanent Russian military presence in Georgia - until after the Abkhazian victory in September, 
1993, which made him much more pliant.
Transdniestrian President Igor Smirnov and the Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba, both in 
place since the break-up of the Soviet Union, have been acting at times very independently from 
Moscow, despite the fact that they owed their positions to Russian military support. Tiraspol and 
Sukhumi have been able to exploit Russia's current weakness and to muster whatever support 
they enjoyed in the Russian capital. Thus, using puppets has not been very successful for Russia.
Military force can also be used indirectly to support those whom Moscow regards as its allies. 
North  Ossetia  is  a  good example of  this.  Against  the  background of strong historical  ties, 
common  religion  and  traditional  military  connections,  the  conflict  between  Ossetians  and 
Georgians led to a "special relationship" being formed between the Ossetian President Askharbek 
Galazov and Moscow. North Ossetian paramilitary units were armed with the weapons provided 
by the Russian Interior Ministry to the South Ossetian peacekeepers.14 North Ossetian laws of 
October 1992 establishing in the republic a unified paramilitary force, though characterized as 
anticonsitutional by the federal authorities, were neither disbanded nor disarmed.
Creating conditions for political dialogue
In virtually all cases, the use of Russian forces to keep or enforce peace was followed by a po-
litical dialogue between the warring factions, with Russia acting as either a sole mediator, or as a 
prominent member of an  international  group.  In  the Chechnya  case,  after  seven months of 
hostilities, it was the Russian Federation itself which started negotiations with its military oppo-
nents.
The presence of Russian forces in the zones of conflict was invariably used by Moscow to push 
the local sides to solutions desirable from the Russian standpoint, such as transforming unitary 
states into  federations. The  Russian  government,  for  instance,  made a  linkage between the 
withdrawal of the 14th army (in 1995 renamed as an operational group) from Transdniestria and 
the political settlement of the dispute in Moldova.
Russian forces, however, have been unable to ensure the return of the refugees, even in the cases 
where that was explicitly provided for in the relevant agreements. An attempt by the then Deputy 
Defence Minister Georgi Kondratyev to force through the return of Georgians to Abkhazia failed 
in 1994, due to the Abkhazian resistance and the lack of support for Kondratyev in Moscow. 
Victor  Polyanichko,  Deputy  Prime Minister  of Russia  and head of the  Russian  emergency 
administration in North Ossetia/Ingushetia was murdered in 1993, after he had reportedly agreed 
to the return of some Ingush refugees.
14 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 March 1994.
Restoring a common defence space of the former Soviet republics
Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian defence planners have been looking for ways to keep 
together the defence space of the former USSR. In the new geostrategic situation in which the RF 
found  itself,  namely,  the  much  reduced likelihood of  global  and  even large-scale  regional 
confrontation, it is local wars and military conflicts which command the attention of Russian 
strategists. The basic military reasons for new alliance-building efforts in the CIS are twofold: 
First, to create a new glacis, a buffer zone in the west and the south; and second, to use, to the 
fullest  extent  possible,  the  old  Soviet  infrastructure  and thus avoid  the expenses which the 
weakened and crisis-ridden Russian economy was simply unable to carry. The need to manage 
the ethnic conflicts in  the NIS was regarded as both a  challenge and an incentive to build 
collective security structures.
Due to the reluctance or the inability of other CIS states to fully cooperate with Russia in this 
field, the first, and so far the only, CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force was organized in Sep-
tember 1993  in Tajikistan. Only military observers from other CIS states arrived in 1994 to 
Abkhazia, where the peacemaking operation is formally being run under the auspices of the CIS. 
With time,  Moscow's Central  Asian allies have become war-weary.  Having suffered losses, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan said in May 1995 that they might withdraw their units, for they have 
no intention of becoming perpetual hostages to the war in Tajikistan.
The military objectives include: Eliminating sources of military danger to Russia
In 1991-1994, the de-facto independent Chechen republic has grown into a potential military 
threat to the interests of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. General Dudayev has 
managed to create an armed force of 15,000 well-trained soldiers, equipped with several dozen 
tanks, heavy guns, aircraft. Even after nine months of fighting, the Chechens were still credited 
with possessing some 80,000 small arms and some heavy weapons.
Containing military threats
Although lying hundreds and thousands of miles from the Russian  territory,  Afghanistan is 
considered to be a formidable source of military instability which may affect Russia. There is no 
way, of course, to "eliminate" that source. Thus, it has to be contained. In Tajikistan, the Russian 
forces have been trying to erect a genuine "iron curtain" to protect the Russian sphere of interests.
Other forms of containment include sealing internal administrative boundaries, as those between 
Chechnya  and  the  neighbouring  republics  of  Daghestan  and  Ingushetia  and  the  Stavropol 
territory, to cut off arms supplies to the Chechen rebels.
Disengagement, observation and cease-fire monitoring
In their peacekeeping role, the Russian forces build a barrier between the warring sides: security 
zones were created along the Dniester (1992), and the Inguri River (Georgia/Abkhazia, 1994), or 
a corridor (Georgia/South Ossetia, 1992). No heavy weapons are allowed within these zones.
On one occasion, in September, 1993, the Russian forces grossly violated their duties by allow-
ing the Abkhazians to make use of their heavy weapons, placed in the Russian custody, to start 
an offensive against the Georgians which ended in the latter's defeat.
Disarmament and disbandment of opposing forces
Disarming "unofficial  armed formations" has been attempted only on the  Russian  territory. 
(Inside the security zones, a  form of "gun control" is practised). In Chechnya, an attempt at 
disarmament initially led to a full-scale war. Later, disarmament was turned into the main pro-
vision of the military agreement signed between the federal authorities and Dudayev's delegation 
in July, 1995. Implementation of that agreement, however, had been proceeding very slowly, 
which led the Russian command to threaten the Dudayevites with forcible disarmament, i.e. the 
resumption of hostilities.
Ever since Gorbachev's 1988 decree on disarmament of unofficial armed formations the number 
of weapons of all kinds in unofficial hands in the USSR/Russia has been growing at an alarming 
rate.
Among other military objectives it would be in order to mention mine-clearing, in view of the 
extensive,  and  often  chaotic,  mine-laying  practised  in  the  various  conflicts,  especially  in 
Abkhazia and Chechnya.
Besides political and military objectives, Russsia's pacification efforts have a range of economic, 
social and psychological goals. These include rendering medical and other humanitarian aid, and 
policing to ensure public safety and guarantee human rights.15
As any analysis of Russia's interests and policies is likely to bear out, there is no such thing as a 
clear concept of pacification which would be integrated into a unified national security strategy. 
In general, Russian authorities usually take a short-term view, and tend to react to the crises.
4. Typology of Military Operations in the CIS
The line between essentially peaceful and warlike actions in peace operations in the CIS is rather 
blurred.  From  keeping  the  peace  to  waging  war.  Mandates  for  particular  operations  are 
sometimes non-existent, and the orders are unclear.It is thus possible to identify several types of 
mission, which sometimes succeed each other, or run parallel within the same operation.
Peacekeeping, i.e. the deployment of neutral Russian forces, under an agreement with all sides to 
the conflict. This has been practised in South Ossetia since June, 1992, and in Transdniestria 
since July, 1992.
Humanitarian  and rescue operations:  evacuation of refugees from the  zone of conflict,  and 
providing the remaining civilian population with humanitarian supplies, were carried out  in 
Abkhazia in 1992-1993,  and, intermittently, in Tajikistan from 1992  onwards. On the other 
hand, there has been no purely humanitarian intervention of the kind attempted by the UN in 
Somalia, or the U.S. in Haiti.
Deterrence, i.e. the show of force and the willingness to use it, was attempted successfully, and in 
its purest form, in Georgia in October and November of 1993. The Russian forces took control of 
major  communications  in  the  western  parts  of  the  country,  leaving  no  chance  to  anti-
Shevardnadze rebels  who had  to  give  up  their  bid  for  power.  The  Russian-led  Collective 
Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan is another example of "strategic" deterrence, which is, however, 
constantly tested at the "tactical" level on the border. To make deterrence credible, the 201st 
MRD has to provide combat support to the border troops.
15 Cf. Law on the Provision of Military and Civilian Personnel.
Police action to stop conflict in the Russian territory was undertaken in November, 1992,  in 
North Ossetia's Prigorodny district, which is also claimed by neighbouring Ingushetia.  Since 
then, the military have been the mainstay of the state of emergency regime in that area.
Counter-terrorist operations have assumed unprecedented proportions during, and in the wake of, 
the Budyonnovsk hostage-taking in the summer of 1995. Covert subversive operations include 
the  use  of  force which is  not  officially admitted.  The  November,  1994,  raid  into  Grozny, 
ostensibly conducted by the anti-Dudayev Provisional Council of Chechnya, but actually mas-
terminded by Russia's Federal Security Service, is a prime but not the only example. Before that, 
Grozny was bombed by unidentified warplanes, as  was the then Georgian-held Sukhumi in 
March, 1993.16 In October, 1992,  Shevardnadze's plane was attacked by unidentified Mi-24 
helicopters near the Russian border.
Border defence is the main action the Russian forces have seen in Tajikistan since the installation 
of the Rakhmonov government in Dushanbe in December, 1992. Similar mission was assigned 
the Border Troops in Chechnya,  especially along the borders with Georgia and the internal 
boundaries with Daghestan and Ingushetia. In the Tajik case, border defence is complemented 
with punitive action against guerilla bases in the adjacent territory of Afghanistan, which has 
come under occasional bombardment, sometimes denied by the Russian military.
Peacemaking per se, i.e. openly taking sides in an armed conflict in order to stop it and impose 
peace, was performed by the 14th army in Transdniestria in June, 1992, and in the autumn and 
winter of 1992  in Tajikistan.  Close to that  comes the behaviour of the Russian military in 
Abkhazia in 1992-1993.  In these three cases, peacemaking was successful. However, it mis-
erably failed in Chechnya in December, 1994, and had to be replaced by war-fighting.
War-fighting remains an extreme, but realistic type of mission. The Chechen war of 1994-1995, 
the largest military campaign since Afghanistan, opened mistakingly as a massive police action, 
after the failure of the covert operation, soon degenerated to a full-scale local conflict.
Russia's Principles for Using Force
Among the principles for using force in intra-state conflicts, Russian authors name legality, 
prevention, careful preparation, and non-interference in internal affairs. This, however, largely 
represents an ideal model, not to say wishful thinking. Thus, in the absence of relevant laws, 
ordinary military units, which happened to be deployed in the areas of conflict, as in Abkhazia in 
1992-1993,  were getting their peacemakers' status by order of the Ministry of Defence. Pre-
ventive deployment has not been practised anywhere in the CIS. The Chechnya operation rep-
resents an extreme case of unpreparedness, but in many other cases preparation was minimal. 
Non-interference in internal affairs is, under the circumstances, a very relative notion.
The  more pertinent  principles include:  for  peacekeeping -  a  cease-fire agreement preceding 
deployment of Russian pecekeeping forces; for war-fighting, achieving a military victory as a 
pre-requisite for a political settlement.
5. Decision-Making on the Use of Force
The process of decision-making on the use of military force is as good an indication as any of the 
state of, and the prospects for, Russia's democratization.
16 One Su-27 was shot down, and the pilot, a Russian Air Force major, was identified.
The legal basis for the use of military forces by Russia includes international agreements of the 
Russian Federation; the RF Constitution and laws; executive orders; court rulings.
The issue of legality of the use of force is highly prominent, but far from resolved, in present-day 
Russia.  After  decades  of  Soviet  arbitrariness,  Russian  society  and  the  Armed  Forces  are 
especially sensitive to the issue of how legal the use of the military is in each particular case. 
Concerned that they not be made to pay for their political masters' blunders, the military have 
been demanding early passage of the law on peacekeeping from the parliament,  and status 
agreements from the diplomats. This yearning for legislation to protect Russian soldiers coexists 
with a clear disdain for laws and legality.
Russian officials routinely claim that RF peacemaking operations are in full agreement with the 
UN Charter and norms. A close examination will no doubt find many divergencies between 
Russian and traditional UN practice, but as the latter is evolving (for instance, in Bosnia), the 
traditional norms are becoming less relevant in the new situations.
To take account of the Russian situation in the CIS, the CSCE/OSCE has been developing 
provisions for Third-Party Peacekeeping, which would give the Russian forces an OSCE status, 
while  giving  the  international  organization  a  degree  of  control  over  their  actions.  This 
compromise, however, does not have a good chance of succeeding.
Within the CIS, there are a number of agreements on peacekeeping, starting with the Kiev accord 
of March 1992. It was not until September 1993, however, that the first Collective Peacekeeping 
Force of the CIS was formed, for Tajikistan. The legal basis for the CPKF is formed by the 
Resolution of the Council of the CIS Heads of State and the Agreement on the CPKF and Joint 
Measures  for  Their  Material-Technical  Support,  both  signed  on  24  September  1993.  The 
peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia was endorsed by the Statement by the CIS leaders of 15 
April 1994.
The CIS umbrella is more apparent than real, however. Two years on, the CPKF consists of a 
Russian motorized infantry division, an independent infantry battalion from Uzbekistan, and a 
Kirghiz company. In Abkhazia, the non-Russian CIS presence is limited to observers. While in 
theory the 12  heads of state have to approve the collective peacekeeping mandate every six 
months, in reality the decision to go on or stop rests with the Russians and, to a certain extent, the 
conflicting sides.
In theory,  the Commanding Officer of the CPKF reports to four Presidents of the countries 
participating in the operation, and is answerable to the four defence ministers, who must endorse 
the "major actions requiring the use of combat forces", as well as CPKF plans. In an emergency, 
the CPKF Commander can take decisions at his own discretion. The reality is different. Other 
reports suggest that all major decisions by the commanding general have first to be cleared with 
the Defence Ministry in Moscow.17
Trilateral agreements on peacekeeping operations between both warring sides and the Russians 
have been the hallmark of Russian peacekeeping. The accords signed at Dagomys, June 1992 
(Georgia/South Ossetia),  Moscow, July 1992  (Moldova/Transdniestria) provide a  convenient 
model which is clearly preferred by Moscow, for it eliminates outsiders and gives Russia the 
power of the sole arbiter. In Karabakh, Tajik and Abkhazian disputes, the Russians have been 
trying to adopt the same model, but their efforts met with only partial success.
17 Igor Korotchenko, in "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 14 April 1995, p. 1.
Bilateral agreements provide for the stationing of Russian forces in the CIS states, and for co-
operation in the guarding of borders. These include, notably, treaties with Georgia, Armenia, and 
Tajikistan.
Use of military forces in Russian law
The Russian Constitution, in force since December, 1993, makes the President, as Head of State, 
primarily responsible for conducting the country's foreign, defence and security policy.  The 
missions of the Armed Forces are stipulated in the 1992 Law on Defence, and in the law on the 
provision of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping operations. The Fundamentals of 
the  Military  Doctrine  assign the  Armed Forces the  tasks  of  peacekeeping,  stopping border 
conflicts, and stopping conflicts within the RF.
The President as head of state, the guarantor of the Constitution and the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces has the right to take a decision on the use of military force, even without going 
through the tortuous procedure of declaring a state of emergency.
There are indications that major decisions on the use of military forces are taken within a very 
small circle of decision-makers, some of whom are the President's personal aides, responsible 
only to the head of state. In this sense, there is little difference, indeed, between the decisions to 
go into Afghanistan in 1979 and to enter Chechnya in 1994.
Abruptness of the decision-making process within the Executive branch was demonstrated by 
both the decision to launch the military operation in December 1994 and the decision to negotiate 
following the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk in June 1995.
The Prime Minister, under the Russian system, is not given full authority over the "power min-
istries" and the MFA. Throughout 1992,  Yegor Gaidar's main preoccupation, not unlike his 
Soviet predecessors', was with the economy, not with national security affairs. Victor Cherno-
myrdin's spectacular action, during the hostage-taking at Budyonnovsk in July 1995, to assume 
control over the "Chechen affairs", was an isolated episode without far-reaching consequences for 
the decision-making process.18
The powers of the Legislature
The Federation Council, or the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly, has to approve the use of 
Russian  armed forces abroad.  (Art.102  of  the  Constitution).  Upon Presidential  request,  the 
Council decides on the advisability of the sending of military forces abroad for peacekeeping 
purposes.
This chamber is made up of the representatives of Russia's 89 regions, some of which may have 
different views on the use of force abroad, or even within the RF. In January, 1995, heads of 
several republics within Russia, many of them traditionally Moslem, convened a special meeting 
at Cheboksary (Chuvash Republic), to protest against the military operation of the Federal forces 
in Chechnya. Nikolai  Fyodorov, President of the Chuvash Republic and the former Russian 
justice minister, promulgated a decree banning the participation in that operation of draftees from 
Chuvashia.  (The  decree  was  immediately  annulled  by  President  Yeltsin).  Sympathies  for 
18 Chernomyrdin himself  confirmed that  in  a newspaper interview. Cf."Izvestia", 13 September 1995,  pp.  1 
and 2.
Dudayev in some of the Moslem republics are a well-known fact. There were even accusations of 
regional authorities helping the Chechens.19
The powers of the Judiciary are limited to constitutional and legal oversight of the military's 
actions, which will be discussed later.
The role of the top military command
Under the Soviet Communist system, the Armed Forces were tightly controlled by the political 
authorities. Since the abolition of the ancien régime, their autonomy has significantly increased. 
In the Russian Federation, they have managed to carve out a niche for themselves in what is 
normally part of foreign policy. By design as well as by default, the military have become policy 
leaders on such issues as  Russia's  relations with  the  conflict-torn  nations of  the  Caucasus, 
Moscow's policy on Tajikistan, and, to a very large extent, the Crimea/Black Sea Fleet issue. It 
also has to be remembered that from the break-up of the USSR in December 1991 until May 
1992 the Russian Federation did not have a military establishment of its own. The Joint Armed 
Forces of the CIS, while misnamed and actually fictitious, did retain a certain measure of inde-
pendence vis-a-vis the new governing group in Moscow.
Apparently nowhere were the Russian military the prime instigators of peace operations. When 
entrusted with the practical conduct of an operation, they tend toward exercising full control of it, 
brushing civilians aside. The case of Chechnya is very characteristic in this regard: The military 
were not among the authors of the decision to march into Chechnya,  but  later  they stayed 
unresponsive to the politicians' attempts to constrain their actions.
The Defence Ministry and the General Staff are not the only military actors in pacification op-
erations. Russian field commanders in the zones of conflict assumed an unpecedented inde-
pendence and unsual influence, especially during the period of transition from the USSR Armed 
Forces to the still-born Joint Armed Forces of the CIS to the national Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation. It was not until April, 1992, when many conflicts, such as in South Ossetia 
or Transdniestria had been raging for many months, that Moscow placed ex-Soviet forces beyond 
Russia's borders under its jurisdiction. Later, the military were affected by the fierce political 
struggle in Moscow itself, and which only ended with the violent showdown in October, 1993.
Some commanders, such as General Alexander Lebed, who in 1992-1995 commanded the 14th 
Army in Moldova, publicly questioned a  broad range of official  policies. Others pursued a 
"foreign policy of their own": While Moscow officially supported the coalition government in 
Tajikistan, the local Russian military supported the Popular Front.20 Despite the ongoing Tajik-
Tajik dialogue, which Moscow supported, the Russian military continue to oppose giving the 
opposition the right to engage in political activity inside Tajikistan.21 In Georgia, Edward She-
vardnadze was clearly a bęte noire of most Russian generals, who intensely resented his record as 
the Soviet Union's foreign minister.
19 For instance, Vice-Premier Sergei Shakhrai named the President of Bashkortostan, Murtaza Rakhimov, as 
someone who allowed the training of Chechen fighters in his republic. "Vek", 19 August 1995.
20 Dodojoni  Atovullo (editor  of  a Tajik émigré newspaper),  "Za chto gibnut  russkie  soldaty v Tajikistane". 
"Izvestia", 13 April 1995, p. 5.
21 Vitali Strugovets. "Votsaritsya li mir pod 'Kryshei mira'?" "Krasnaya Zvezda", 9 June 1995, p. 3.
The role of the MVD
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which has its own troops some 300,000  strong, is 
supposed to play a leading role in Russia's efforts at internal pacification. Since 1992, this has 
been the case in  Prigorodny district,  the area  of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.  In  Chechnya, 
however, the MVD was unable to defeat Dudayev's forces, and had to accept the Armed Forces' 
primacy. While the first overall commander of the federal forces in Chechnya was an MVD gen-
eral, later this job went to Army men.
The role of the Border Troops
Like the MVD troops, the size of Border Troops (PV) has been growing, to reach about 200,000. 
The Federal Border Service (FPS), until 1991 part of the KGB, has assumed an independent 
status immediately under the President, and its Director sits on the RF Security Council together 
with the ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs, and the security services chiefs. General Grachev's 
attempts to place the PV under the operational command of the general Staff have been thwarted. 
So far, the FPS has managed to establish itself as a co-equal of the other "power ministries".
In the various conflicts where his men are involved, the FPS Director retains a broad freedom of 
action. Thus, the decision on whether the PV would adhere to the Tehran inter-Tajik accord was 
made by the FPS Director himself.22
The Border Troops have been maintaining, since early 1995, that they are not bound by the inter-
Tajik  cease-fire agreement, signed in Tehran in December, 1994.  Thus,  the Frontier Forces 
refused the ban on re-deployment. As far as the Frontier Forces were concerned, the Dushanbe 
regime was the only legal government in Tajikistan, bound to Moscow by a treaty, while the 
opposition was a  group of bandits.  In December, 1994,  the opposition accused the Russian 
border guards of arrests of local fighters and their handover to the Dushanbe authorities, and of 
capturing opposition arms depots. In March, 1995, the Russians airlifted Dushanbe government's 
formations from Kulyab to the border in Pamir and disarmed local fighters. (Dubnov, NV 16/95, 
p.14).  As a  result,  relations in Badakhshan soured to such an extent that  a  conflict ensued 
between the opposition and the self-defence forces, on the one hand, and the border guards, on the 
other, in April, 1995.
The role of the Federal Security Service (FSB)
As the main successor of the KGB, the Federal Security Service (80,000 members) takes the lead 
in information-gathering/processing/dissemination, and is involved in covert operations. In the 
case of Chechnya,  both types of activity came in for heavy criticism. Col.General  Yevgeni 
Podkolzin, commander of the Airborne Forces, publicly accused the FSB (at the time known as 
FSK) of misleading the military as to the size and capabilities of Dudayev's forces. The un-
fortunate covert operation in Grozny in late November, 1994, masterminded by the FSK, not 
only tarnished the reorganized agency's reputation, but  very likely precipitated the Kremlin's 
decision to intervene in force in Chechnya, even without due preparation.
22 Oleg Panfilov. Rossiyskie samolety bombyat badakhshanskie kishlaki. "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 12 April 1995, 
p. 1.
Cooperation and conflicts among the "Power Ministries".
The enhanced status of the cabinet ministries in post-Soviet Russia provides good opportunities 
for the power ministries to pursue their own interests, or implement their leaders' concepts. When 
these broadly agree, this results in an alliance which is virtually invincible, in bureaucratic terms. 
In the last few years of the USSR, the power ministries' only formidable opponent was the 
Foreign Ministry, or MID. Recently, however, the evolution of the MID's policies has placed it 
firmly in the "power camp". Tajikistan and Chechnya are both the results of this harmonious 
relationship.
In Tajikistan, the "power ministries" and the MID agreed that the Rakhmonov regime, though far 
from perfect, was preferable to any experiment with transition.
When conflicts do occur, they are tactical in scope and nature. In Tajikistan, for example, there 
has  been  some  friction  between  the  Frontier  Forces  (PV)  and  the  Russian-led  Collective 
Peacekeeping Force. CPKF supported the PV, which were regarded to be "the first echelon of the 
Collective Peacekeeping Force".23 Later,  however, there were complaints of a  lack of armor, 
artillery and aerial support to the Border Troops from the CPKF. These were made against the 
background of Defence Minister Grachev's attempts to integrate the Federal  Border Service 
within the defence establishment.
During the Chechnya operation, which initially saw little coordination among the forces report-
ing to different ministries, tension ran high at times between army and MVD troops, and between 
the latter and the frontier forces in Grozny. (1995). The appointment, in August 1995, of Oleg 
Lobov, Secretary of the RF Security Council, as the President's representative in Chechnya, made 
him the most senior Russian official in the territory, a kind of a viceroy, empowered to give 
orders to cabinet ministers. In the zone of the North Ossetia/ Ingushetia conflict, where, unlike 
Chechnya,  a  state of emergency was officially declared (in November 1992),  a  Provisional 
Administration was established, more or less along the lines of the Soviet administration for 
Nagorno-Karabakh in the late 1980s.
The cumbersome and often confusing process of decision-making in the matters pertaining to the 
use of military forces for pacification purposes gives those opposing Russia's actions ample 
opportunity to exploit internal divisions and differences of opinion in the Russian government 
and in Russian society.
6. Conduct of Operations
The conduct of Russia's pacification operations depends, primarily, on the type of operation. This 
is reflected in the mandate for operation, and the form of that mandate; the willingness to use 
force and the availability of resources; and the strategy designed for each particular case.
All pacification operations within the range discussed are essentially civic-military. Cooperation 
with local authorities is considered to be indispensable. This cooperation can take a variety of 
forms, from first installing a friendly regime and then using it as a puppet, as happened initially 
in Tajikistan, as well as in Chechnya, to working in parallel with the conflicting sides, as in the 
Georgia/Abkhazia, or North Ossetia/Ingushetia disputes to establishing ties with local strongmen, 
as  Aslan  Abashidze,  the  Ajarian  leader,  or  the  local  authorities  and  field  commanders  in 
Badakhshan, and also in Chechnya.
23 Col.General  Boris  Pyankov.  "My obyazany utverdit'  mir v Tadzhikistane".  An interview with  "Krasnaya 
Zvezda", 9 November 1993, p. 2.
After the period of "withdrawalism", when the Russians were either abandoning the former 
imperial outposts, such as Karabakh or South Ossetia, and were shy to use force even in self-
defence, as in Tajikistan in the spring of 1992, the willingness to use force and sustain losses, if 
need be, is back. Chechnya is as good an example of this as any other. One might conclude from 
this that the Afghan syndrome has been largely overcome.
Willingness to use troops there may be, but the forces available remain scarce. In his letter to the 
Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin, dated 31 January, 1995, Mikhail Kolesnikov, Chief of the General 
Staff, estimated the size of a  "special troop contingent" at  20,000  to 22,000  men. This may 
suffice for pure peacekeeping, but not for other missions.
Plans to organize Russian Peacemaking Forces as a corps within the Armed Forces have failed to 
materialize. At this time, there are two divisions which have been assigned peacekeeping duties: 
the 27th MRD of the Volga MD and the 45th MRD of the Leningrad MD. There are also 
Airborne Forces, ready for immediate deployment, but their resources are stretched thin. As to the 
Emergency Situations Ministry, which, it was initially thought, would have had to be the agency 
specializing in peacekeeping, its resources can only make it a provider of humanitarian supplies.
Failed neutrality?
Initially, Russia tried to remain neutral to the conflicts on its former borderlands. Official neu-
trality was attempted in the autumn of 1991 in South Ossetia and Transdniestria. The members 
of the Soviet Union's disintegrating armed forces, however, were becoming progressively in-
volved in the conflicts themselves: some were privately selling arms and ammunition to the 
warring factions, while others fought on the side of their ethnic brethren. Repeatedly, Russian 
forces got caught in the crossfire, and had to return the fire. Especially serious were attempts by 
the  local  authorities to  appropriate  Russian  military  arsenals.  In  Transdniestria,  laws were 
adopted declaring those arsenals to be the property of the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Re-
public. In Tajikistan, attempts to use the army as a power broker in the spring and summer of 
1992 did not prevent the country slipping into a large-scale civil war. Thus, passive "neutrality" 
was leading to a loss of control. Only the bold action by General Alexander Lebed prevented the 
14th army from being taken over by the Tiraspol authorities.
In some cases, as in the conflict between North Ossetia and Ingushetia in early November 1992, 
Russian inaction was clearly favouring one of the sides.
Choosing the right side
Russia's lack of credibility as a fair dealer was most evident in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. In 
October, 1992,  Russian observers all  but  allowed the pro-Abkhaz forces (the Chechens, ex-
OMON people from the Baltic) to seize Gagra. Almost a year later, the Russians assisted in the 
Abkhazian seizure of the capital, Sukhumi, and the expulsion of the Georgians.
In other cases, the Russian military provided material support to one of the sides. During the 
conflict, Deputy Premier Georgi Khizha decided to issue the Ossetians with more arms equip-
ment and ammunition. The Ingush considered this as pro-Ossetian. Later, in December 1992, 
Ingush President Ruslan Aushev demanded that  a  Russian Interior Ministry battalion, partly 
composed  of  ethnic  Ingush,  be  deployed  to  Ingushetia.  In  South  Ossetia,  the  Ossetian 
peacekeepers (and not the Georgians) were equipped by the Russians.
In several cases, the Russian forces actually merged with the party which they considered to be 
"right". In the midst of the civil war in Tajikistan, they started tilting to one side (the Popular 
Front), backing its October 1992 attempt to seize the capital, and then evacuating its leader. In 
1993-1994,  the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan included Tajik  army units 
(though not, of course, those of the opposition, who were called "bandits" and "extremists"). On 
the eve of the flare-up of armed violence between North Ossetia and Ingushetia in 1992, the 
Russian Security Council ruled to unify Russian and North Ossetian Forces.24
Examples of this kind are abundant: they include, i.a., using PV helicopters to airlift, in early 
1995 a Tajik government battalion to Badakhshan, which was considered by the opposition to be 
a major violation of the ceasefire agreement, and seriously undermined Moscow's credibility as a 
mediating party. This charge was denied by the Russian commander who said that the Tajiks in 
question were in fact Tajik nationals serving with the Russian Frontier Forces in Tajikistan, and 
in fact making up the bulk of enlisted men there. After a series of incidents in the spring of 1995, 
the Tajik opposition refused to continue to regard Russia as a neutral party. Defence Minister 
Pavel Grachev spoke against using the Russian Armed Forces and border guards "to neutralize 
band formations inside Tajikistan". (Dubnov, p.14).
As to the rules of engagement, they ranged from self-victimizing inaction to the use force in self-
defence to a no-holds-barred situation. These included Vice President Alexander Rutskoi's threats 
to bomb Tbilisi unless the Georgian forces stopped their advance in South Ossetia; accusations of 
Russian aerial bombardments of Afghanistan to take out Tajik opposition strongholds and bases; 
large-scale  aerial  bombardments  of  Grozny  and  the  mountainous  villages  in  Chechnya  in 
1994-1995.
7. Is There a Political Control?
In Russia, control of the use of military forces is performed by the Constitutional Court and the 
Parliament, with the President acting both as the Armed Forces' Commander-in-Chief and the 
supreme guarantor of the Constitution. A very special role was played by the Human Rights 
commissioner of the Duma and the President (a post occupied by Sergei Kovalyov).
The national leadership is reproached for illegal use of the military, while the troops are often 
accused of ill discipline, disrespect for local customs, and of having no clear idea of their role and 
functions.
The Constitutional Court considered the constitutionality of the presidential decrees of 30 No-
vember and 9 December 1994 ordering the Chechnya operation, and found that the President had 
every right to use military force to suppress an armed rebellion in any part of the Federation.
Members of the Russian parliament argued that the Presidential decrees "On the Fundamental 
Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", which allowed the use of the 
Armed Forces, "On the Measures to Restore Constitutional Legality and Law and Order in the 
Territory of the Chechen Republic", which failed to proclaim a state of emergency in Chechnya, 
"On the Measures to Suppress the activities of Illegal Armed Formations in the Territory of the 
Chechen Republic and in the Zone of Ossetian-Ingush Conflict" were not consistent with the 
Russian Constitution.
They claimed that the 1992 Law on Defence, to date the only act governing the use of Armed 
Forces, does not recognize the use of the military in internal conflicts, except in situations gov-
24 Ossipova, p. 15.
erned by the Law on the State of Emergency, which demands that such use should be preceeded 
by proper notification of both chambers of parliament.
The Presidential side claimed that the decrees agreed with the "content of the Constitution", and 
that the President as the guarantor of the Constitution and the Commander in Chief had every 
right to take all measures, including the use of the Armed Forces, to protect the population, and 
defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state.
The Parliament debated the use of military forces, but without serious consequences. A parlia-
mentary commission was formed by the Duma to look into the war in Chechnya, but the results 
of its work did not leave a lasting imprint. Also, the Parliament routinely sent delegations to the 
various "hot spots" where Russia was engaged in peacemaking.
The Human Rights Commissioner was active in Chechnya only, between December 1994 and 
mid-1995, when his post was abolished. As to other conflicts, the NGOs, such as Helsinki Watch 
or  Amnesty  International,  as  well  as  the  Russian  media,  made  the  public  aware  of  the 
developments.
Except for the small political rallies in Moscow and the attempts, in the wake of Chechnya, by a 
few regions of Russia,  such as  Chuvashia,  to  exempt local  conscripts from military service 
outside of the home territory, the public remained largely unmoved by the use of military forces 
in the "hot spots". This was in striking contrast to the universal cry of "Bring the boys home!" 
which thundered across the country in 1991.
Whereas some two-thirds to three-quarters of the population were against the Chechnya war 
during most of 199525, most of them felt for the Russian soldiers more than for the other victims 
of the war. So, while on the one hand, there was a "positive impact on the process of civic-society 
formation in Russia".26 There was also a revival of chauvinistic attitudes and even elements of 
racism in  Russia,  when all  "darkies" are  increasingly and indiscriminately seen as  bandits, 
criminals, etc.
8. Limits of Russian Military Involvement
Political limitations
As shown by both the peacekeeping operations and the war in Chechnya, military action can not 
be an end in itself. In intra-state conflicts, military solutions are illusory. The use of military 
forces can be of value only if it promotes a more or less stable political settlement.
Going it mostly alone, Russia bears the burden of a  post- or neo-imperial power. She is not 
perceived as a foreign and impartial power, but rather as the new incarnation of the old "Centre". 
Throughout the former Soviet Union, there are groups vociferously opposed to a  continued 
Russian  role,  and  Moscow's  interventionism  has  the  inevitable  effect  of  galvanizing  that 
opposition. In Ingushetia, Russian forces have been seen, since the 1992 conflict, as unfriendly 
aliens. A testimony to this were the attempts to stop the Russian military advance into Chechnya, 
December 1994. In Chechnya itself, a generation may grow up who will regard Russia as the 
eternal enemy.
25  Cf.,  e.g.,  Rozalina  Ryvkina and Yuri  Simagin.  Status  Chechni:  naselenie  protiv pozitsii  vlastei. 
"Segodnya", 18 July 1995, p. 3.
26 Aleksandr Iskandaryan. Chechnya: Nachalo bolshogo puti. "Novoye Vremya", No. 15, April 1995, p. 20.
While the Russians exercise their new pacifying mission, each side to each conflict will use their 
presence for its own purposes, trying to use the Russians as its allies. This almost automatically 
makes Russian actions suspicious in the eyes of all participants.
A serious weakness of Russian pacification efforts is a break between the military intervention 
and the political settlement. The longer the break, or the more acutely it is felt (as in Georgia, due 
to the pressure of the refugees), the less tenable the Russian position becomes. Moscow, however, 
believes  that  Russian  presence  should  continue  until  the  final  settlement  (South  Ossetia, 
Transdniestria). Others may not see it that way, and try to delink the two issues, as Moldova.
The self-proclaimed states of Abkhazia and Transdniestria tend to use the Russians peacekeepers 
as a  de-facto border force, protecting their new and unrecognized statehood, and freezing the 
situation on the ground to their advantage. Elections and constitutional referenda were taking 
place, which made dispute settlement ever more difficult. Their opponents, for their part, try to 
turn the Russians into a police force to right all the wrongs. (Georgians in Abkhazia)
Domestic political limitations
On the whole, post-Communist Russian society has demonstrated a significant degree of indif-
ference to the losses sustained as a result of military intervention. Briefly,as in the cases of the 
1993 attack on a Russian frontier post on the Tajik-Afghan border, or the disastrous storming of 
Grozny on New Year's day, 1995, the media succeeded in sensitizing the public to the human 
cost of the various operations. The public response, however, was never very strong or lasting. 
Most Russians continued to be mostly concerned with their own daily survival in the midst of 
economic crisis, and learned to be indifferent to human suffering, if that did not affect them 
personally. The only groups which responded actively, and often effectively, were conscripts and 
their families. Draft-dodging has become commonplace; desertions from military units, especially 
in Chechnya, became a real problem; and the soldiers' mothers' movement received a powerful 
boost.
Financial limitations
Budget constraints are among the most serious limitations to the new peacekeepers everywhere. 
Russia is no exception. At one time, the Defence Ministry was on the point of giving control over 
peace operations to the Emergencies Ministry, unless the budget carried a special provision for 
such operations. The war in Chechnya cost the MOD budget 1.9 trln roubles (about $400 m), 
which amounted to some 5 per cent of the defence budget.27
Force limitations
The Russian Armed Forces continue to shrink, without receiving a qualitative compensation. The 
way the forces were assembled for the Chechen campaign in the winter of 1994/95 is a graphic 
illustration of the paucity of manpower.
In an attempt to get around these limitations, Russian authorities have been drafting indigenous 
soldiers, under joint border defence agreements, into Russian-led forces. Thus, the 16,000 men 
strong Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, about 12,000 are Tajik citizens.28 Similar 
situation exists in the Russian border troops in Georgia and Armenia. This harks back to a 
27 Maj.Gen. Vladimir Osadchiy, of the MOD, as quoted by "Izvestia", 25 August 1995, p. 1.
Czarist tradition of extensive use of native-born officers and men in the forces deployed on the 
borderlands.29
9. An Evaluation of the Results of the Use of Force
Against such an array of challenges, it may look like a small miracle that the Russian military 
forces have been able to achieve such meaningful results in the search for the goal of pacification. 
Secession  was  forestalled,  conflicts  are  either  frozen  (Georgia,  Moldova)  or  manageable 
(Tajikistan).
The military's relative success has not been backed by spectacular political accords. Negotiations 
were started in all zones of conflict, but Russia's economic resources are too limited to back up a 
settlement with aid infusions. But even without it, Moscow remains too distracted to attach high 
priority to suspended conflicts. It took the Federal authorities a year to develop a program of 
measures to solve the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, but few of these measures were carried out since 
then.
The Russians were more successful in legalizing their military presence in the zones of conflict.
Even the Chechen delegation in Grozny had to agree to the stationing of two Russian brigades in 
the republic. In Tajikistan, even the opposition does not demand a Russian withdrawal. What 
they ask for is a  UN-like impartiality.  In semi-independent Badakhshan, which is ethnically 
different from the rest of Tajikistan, Russian forces are still welcome as protectors and sources of 
technical support, though not the Dushanbe government troops.
The impact of the new situation on the Russian forces themselves has been strong. For many 
servicemen, peacetime is over, and fighting is back. As in the 1800s, war on the borderlands is 
becoming routine. The Afghan syndrome has faded, but the Afghan experience is again in great 
demand. Memories of the Caucasian war of the 19th century are being revived, and the friend-
and-foe mentality has become strengthened.
On the other hand, morale is being sapped by low pay and inadequate conditions of service on the 
borderlands. The CPKF Commander complained that his pay was six times less than that of a 
private UN peacekeeper.30 A Border Troops officer serving in Tajikistan (probably in the captain 
- major category) was getting between 2 and 2.5 m roubles (about $ 440 - 550) per month, four 
times the average salary in Russia and many times that in Tajikistan.31
Russian domestic politics, too, have experienced banalization of the use of force. In terms of the 
relations with the regions, the use of federal forces in Chechnya has produced only limited 
repercussions in the rest of the Northern Caucasus, except Ingushetia and Chechen-populated 
areas of Daghestan. There, Russia's role as an imperialist oppressor was confirmed. Other re-
publics have not been affected. The local authorities are more afraid of the indigenous radicals, 
and the radicals appear to be deterred by Moscow's forceful action.
Implications for Russian foreign policy from Moscow's use of military forces have been mani-
fold. Peacemaking gradually drew Moscow's attention to the near abroad and provided Russia 
28 Col.Gen.  Andrei  Nikolayev, as interviewed for  "The Moment of  Truth" programme by the RTR Russian 
Television, broadcast on 18 September 1995.
29 Cf., e.g., Sergei Witte's memoirs: S.Yu.Witte. Vospominaniya. Tom 1, s.... .
30 Boris Pyankov in "Krasnaya Zvezda", 9 November 1993, p. 2.
31 Col.Gen.Andrei Nikolayev, as interviewed for "The Moment of Truth" by the RTR Russian Television on 18 
September 1995.
with an opportunity to exercise the role it has been claiming for itself, that of a centre of power in 
the former Soviet Union.
Russia's neighbours generally see Moscow's attempts to be Central Eurasia's great stabilizer as a 
revival of neo-imperialist, or neo-derzhava policies. Some are willing to play along; others fear 
for their independence.
The use of force has its costs, both human and material. During the 9-year war in Afghanistan 
(December 1979-February 1989) the Soviet Union's losses amounted to some 15,000, including 
13,833 in the 40th Army.32 The military's losses in Chechnya amounted to about 1500 in the 
eight months of the operation. From 1988 till mid-1995, the Airborne Forces lost more troops 
than they did during the Afghan war.33 The Border Troops in Tajikistan have lost about 100 men 
at the hands of the opposition forces. Terrorism is another problem: 15 Russian servicemen were 
killed in Tajikistan in 1994,  and 13  in the first half of 1995.34 In the first two years of its 
existence (1993-1995), the CPKF lost 29 men killed. (LTG Valentin Bobryshev, Commander, 
CPKF, in an interview with "Krasnaya Zvezda": "Voyennaya pobeda oppozitsii nevozmozhna", 
23 September 1995, p. 2).
Civilian casualties in Chechnya, between December 1994 and December 1995 are estimated at 
some 25,000.
Material cost of the Chechnya war is put by some analysts at $5 bn in the first six months. Indi-
rect material losses include a drop of at least 27 per cent in foreign investment in Russia in the 
first quarter of 1995, as compared with the fourth quarter of 1994, which could be attributed to 
the war in Chechnya. (Elena Fyodorova. Voyna v Chechne stala baryerom dlya inostrannykh in-
vestitsiy. "Finansovye Izvestia", 27 June 1995, p. 2).
Thus, the question remains unanswered, will Russia, by means of using force, restore its great-
ness or will it instead exhaust itself?
10. Is There Place for Multilateralism?
Initially,in 1991-1992, the Russian government was seized by the euphoria of "returning to the 
civilized world". The international community, led by the United Nations, it was believed, would 
resolve post-Soviet crises, and relieve Russia of the burden of imperialism.
Since mid-1992, apprehension started growing within the Russian governing elite that multilat-
eral peacekeeping was in fact paving the way for foreign penetration, detrimental to the interests 
of the Russian Federation.
In early 1993, Moscow declared the whole of the former USSR to be a zone of Russia's vital 
national security interests. It was willing to cooperate with international organizations, but on the 
basis  of  a  privileged  Russia+UN  (CSCE)  formula,  sharing  the  burdens  and  the  costs  of 
peacekeeping with others.
There being few takers, Moscow started using the CIS as a useful umbrella for its activities. In 
actual fact, Russia has been going it largely alone. This unilateralism can be damaging to Rus-
sian interests, arousing suspicions of imperialism, and threatening with overextension of Russia's 
strained resources.
32 Col.Gen. Boris Gromov, as interviewed by Russian TV, on 19 August 1995.
33 Colonel  General Yevgheni Podkolzin,  interviewed by "Moskovskie Novosti", No. 51, 30 July - 6 August 
1995, p. 7.
34 Vitali Strugovets. "Tajikistan: Zatishye pered burei?" "Krasnaya Zvezda", 20 July 1995, p. 2.
Still, multilateralism is seen as constraining Russia.The result of the OSCE's efforts could in fact 
be "to reduce the freedom of action of Russian military forces in other states of the former Soviet 
Union which are the seat of ethnic conflict".35
There are  some prospects for  two security  regimes appearing in  Europe:  one Transatlantic 
(NATO-centered), and one Eurasian (Russian-led). This would serve Russia's ambitions, and 
probably give NATO a new role to play, but would effectively divide Europe in terms of security 
regimes.
Still,  there is  some place for true  multilateralism in peacekeeping. Moscow's unprecedented 
agreement to have a OSCE mission in Chechnya is not to be underestimated.
Conclusions
The use of force by the Russian Federation as a means of stability building represents, to a large 
extent, a new phenomenon. It substantially differs both from the Soviet and imperial Russian 
tradition and from the current practices of other countries.
The Russian Federation has quickly overcome its aversion to the use of military force for pur-
poses other than defence against direct attack. Foreign interventions, and even massive use of 
violence within Russia's borders are generally, although passively, accepted. As evidenced by the 
war in Chechnya, the Afghan syndrome has ceased to play a restraining role.
Russia's actions in the NIS are hardly an attempt at imperial restoration. In fact, Russia's case is 
almost unique in that we have an empire which was willing to break up without a fight, and 
armed forces which made no attempt to intervene to salvage the state they served, and waited 
patiently to be divided up, withdrawn or de-commissioned. Initially, the Russian Federation was 
reluctant to use force to manage or stop conflicts in the NIS, and when it did use it, this was often 
based on the recognition that military force was the only surviving component of national power 
at Moscow's disposal.
Viewed from a  different perspective, Russia's use of force for 'peacemaking' is anything but 
disinterested. Moscow can not be expected to be impartial to what it regards as its national in-
terest.
A striking feature of the Russian use of force is confusion regarding its strategy, often due to 
political struggles in Moscow, and occasional loss of control at operational and tactical levels, 
pointing to the loss of governability of the nation in general and the drop of discipline among the 
military in particular.
Institutionally, the decision-making process on the use of force is often impenetrable to outsiders. 
The Executive and,  above all,  the Presidency clearly dominates it.  The rise and fall  in  the 
influence of other executive players, such as the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, are indicative of 
the changing balance of power in the Russian capital.
The role of the Legislature, which in 1991-1993 used to compete with the Executive for ultimate 
power and used the areas of conflict as an extended battlefield in its struggle against the Presi-
dent, is severely limited by the 1993 Constitution. Still, the upper chamber has the power to 
approve sending Russian forces abroad, and the lower house has become the focus for national 
debate on the use of force.
35 Blackwill in "Engaging Russia". p. 51.
The Judiciary, and the Constitutional Court in particular, has become an active participant only 
recently. Apparently deterred by the memories of its unfortunate political involvement in 1993, it 
is careful not to antagonize the Executive with its verdicts.
The media, on the contrary, have been active in examining, and often criticizing, the way Russian 
forces were used in the various conflicts in the NIS, and especially in Chechnya. The latter 
represents a striking example of the Russian Federation fighting its first war under conditions of a 
free press, with the scenes of the battle for Grozny and the Prime Minister's telephone nego-
tiations with the terrorists brought to the Russian people's homes in real time.
The public, however, has remained largely apathetic both to the conflicts in the NIS, even where 
the local ethnic Russian communities had to suffer, and to the Russian government's use of force 
to manage those conflicts. Even the war in Chechnya, except for its more dramatic episodes, has 
failed to mobilize public opinion.
Russia's attempts at using its military as an instrument of stability-building have evoked mixed 
reaction abroad. WITHIN THE CIS, Russia's new client states or allies have been trying to use it 
to bolster their positions. Others believe they have reasons to fear Russian interventionism. In a 
number of instances, the use of force by the Russian Federation is taken to be the testimony of the 
allegedly incurably expansionist nature of Russian expansion. The major  Western states are 
prepared to let Russia engage in stability-building efforts as long as this does not impinge on the 
Western interests in such areas as the Baltic States, or the Crimea. This appears to be well 
understood in Moscow.
For Russia, the results of the use of force in the various conflict situations have been both positive 
and negative.
Russian intervention has been successful in containing and freezing, if not ending, some of the 
post-Soviet conflicts, thus preventing the worst and creating conditions for political settlement.
In other cases, most notably in Chechnya, but also in Tajikistan, armed intervention has led to 
Russia's progressive involvement in protracted conflicts, demanding heavy losses and offering 
little chance of an early disengagement.
With many of the NIS remaining very unstable for years to come, Russia will pursue its efforts to 
pacify its  immediate environment and to protect its  national  interests. In this,  Moscow will 
predictably continue to find few rivals, but many critics.
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Summary
Introductory Remarks
Since 1991, Russia has been involved in a number of violent conflicts on the territory of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Its military activities have taken quite different forms - 
from peacekeeping missions to direct military intervention - and have accordingly been differ-
ently assessed - as an effective stabilization measure in inter-ethnic "conflict situations" or as part 
of a "re-imperialization strategy". Up to now, however, little attempt has been made to see the 
Russian "peacekeeping" activities for what they really are: the use of military force as a way of 
stability-building or pacification in a region that is regarded as the zone of Russia's vital national 
security interests. For this reason, the present report endeavours to analyse Russia's military 
activities in the context of its regional security interests. It is based on a number of case studies 
and on a review of ongoing press coverage.
Findings
1. Following an initial phase after the disintegration of the USSR during which Russian offi-
cialdom appeared reluctant to intervene in the conflicts that broke out in the New Inde-
pendent States, as of about 1993 a consensus emerged among the Russian political elite to 
the effect that the CIS region was vital to Russian security interests. The ongoing conflicts 
within the region justified, indeed necessitated military intervention. At first, the purpose 
was to defend the unity of the Russian Federation, but later this aim was extended to man-
aging the crises within the CIS and to reducing the level and scale of violence. In the course 
of time, other motives such as the desire to protect ethnic Russian minorities and to defend 
the perimeter boundaries of the region, the former Soviet borders, gained in importance, 
too. Russia's influence in the New Independent States needed to be strengthened, foreign 
influences rolled back, and Russian access to the natural resources of the New Independent 
States secured. Besides these national interests, the special interests of particular groups - 
for example the power ministries or regional elites - can also play a very significant rôle.
2. In the beginning, the Russian political class shied away from using military force. The con-
stitution of national governments in Chechnya, Georgia and Moldova, which openly turned 
against the central government in Moscow, and the emergence of the Islamic movement in 
Tajikistan drew no resolute response from the Russian authorities. In the case of Chechnya, 
the Supreme Soviet even expressly banned the use of military force in late 1991. Soon, 
however, the new Russia's leaders became aware that they had hardly any other means of 
influencing developments in these regions. Russia's economic, financial and diplomatic re-
sources were either lacking or very scarce, so Russia turned to the only instrument it still 
had - the armed forces.
3. The objectives sought through the use of military force were manifold. In some cases, the aim 
was to suppress secessionist rebellions, in others to end chaos and stop armed violence or - 
where conflict had not yet openly broken out - to preserve the peace. In some regions, 
however, - e.g. in Georgia - the goal was to install and support a regime friendly to Russia 
or to create propitious conditions for a political dialogue. But besides these more political 
intentions there were also some purely military objectives - to restore the "common defence 
space" and to contain potential military threats. No clear dividing line can be drawn in the 
CIS between essentially peaceful missions and the use of military force. While the actions 
in South Ossetia and Transdniestria were evidently of a peacekeeping nature, the operation 
in Georgia in late 1993  was clearly intended as a  demonstration of military strength. 
Russian troops have variously been deployed in the context of police actions, in counter-
terrorist campaigns, and in their own covert subversive operations. Military force has been 
openly used in a number of peacemaking actions, in the defence of borders or - in the case 
of Chechnya - in outright warfare.
4. Theoretically, the use of military force is governed by the principles of legality, prevention 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. In practice, however, these prin-
ciples have been hardly evident. Few agreements on peacekeeping have been concluded 
within the framework of the CIS; in many cases the legal basis for Russian actions are 
trilateral agreements between Russia and the two warring sides. De jure it is the President 
who decides on the deployment of troops, de facto the decision appears to be taken within a 
very small  inner circle. Apparently nowhere were the Russian military themselves the 
prime instigators of peace operations. As soon as they become involved in a  conflict, 
however, they tend to elude control by the political authorities, taking decisions of their 
own accord.
5. It is clear that, in intra-state conflicts, military solutions are illusory, only political settlements 
can be viable in the long run. In many cases, however, it has not been possible to reach 
such a settlement. Actions by the Russian armed forces are constrained by the shortage of 
financial resources, by obstructionism on the part of conscripts and their families, and by 
the declining combat capability of the army. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces have 
achieved a number of military successes which, however, have not been carried through to 
political accords. This is having repercussions on the armed forces themselves, which for 
all  practical purposes find themselves in a  state of war in many locations. Continuing 
casualties and rising material costs are placing a burden on Russian politics. There is no 
sign of any clear-cut strategy on the use of military force.
